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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by §78-22(3) (j), U.C.A. This appeal is from a final order of the
District Court of the Third Judicial District of Tooele
County, State of Utah. The order to be reviewed is the Order
entered October 13, 1989 (R.655) and the lower court's
rulings from the bench leading up to that Order (R.660 and
661, p. 36-44). The Notice of Appeal was filed November 13,
1989.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY EXTENDED THE TIME FOR REDEMPTION
FROM THE SHERIFF'S SALE TO OCTOBER 10, 1989.
POINT II
HAVING PROPERLY EXTENDED THE REDEMPTION PERIOD, THE LOWER
COURT WAS IN ERROR IN TERMINATING THAT EXTENSION BY ITS
ARBITRARY BENCH RULINGS OF SEPTEMBER 8 AND OCTOBER 2, 1989
AND ITS ORDER OF OCTOBER 13, 1989.
POINT III
LEWISES WERE ENTITLED TO A HEARING UNDER RULE 69(f)(3) TO
DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OR PROPRIETY OF THE REDEMPTION
AMOUNT AND WERE ENTITLED TO OFFSET OR RECOUP AGAINST THE
REDEMPTION PRICE THE COST TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE TO THE
PROPERTY DONE BY STATE LINE.
POINT IV
THE REMEDY PROVIDED IN RULE 69(g)(1) DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS
CASE NOR DOES IT PRECLUDE AN OFFSET UNDER A RULE 69(f)(3)
DETERMINATION.

STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED
Utah Code Annotated
§78-37-6 Right of redemption—Sales by parcels—Of land and
water stock
Sales of real estate under judgments of foreclosure of
mortgages and liens are subject to redemption as in case of
sales under executions generally. In all cases where the
judgment directs the sale of land, together with shares of
corporate stock evidencing title to a water right used or
intended to be used, or suitable for use, on the land, the
court shall equitably apportion such water stock to the land,
or some part thereof, in one or more parcels, as it may deem
suitable for the sale thereof, and the land and water stock
in each parcel shall be sold together, and for the purpose of
such sale shall be regarded as real estate and subject to
redemption as above specified. In all sales of real estate
under foreclosure the court may determine the parcels and the
order in which such parcels of property shall be sold.
-iv-

Code of Judicial Administration
Rule 4-501. Notions.
(1)

Filing and service of motions and memoranda.

(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions,
except uncontested or ex parte matters, shall be accompanied
by a memorandum of points and authorities, appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents
relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length
exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as provided in
paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the court on exparte application. If an ex-parte application is made to
file an over-length memorandum, the application shall state
the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum
is in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a
summary of the memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties within
ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in
opposition to the motion, all supporting documentation and a
copy of the proposed order. If the responding party fails to
file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days
after service of the motion, the moving party may notify the
clerk to submit the matter to the court for decision as
provided in paragraph 1(d) of this rule.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 6. Time.

(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice
given thereunder or by order of the court an act is required
or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1)
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or
(2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was
the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b),
(d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except to the extent
and under the conditions stated in them.

-v-

(d) For motions—Affidavits. A written motion, other
than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the
hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before
the time specified for the hearing, unless a different period
is fixed by these rules or by order of the court. Such an
order may for cause shown be made on ex parte application.
When a motion is supported by affidavit, the affidavit shall
be served with the motion; and, except as otherwise provided
in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may be served not later
than 1 day before the hearing, unless the court permits them
to be served at some other time.

Rule 65A. Injunctions.
. . . .

(b) Temporary restraining order; notice; rehearing;
duration. No temporary restraining order shall be granted
without notice to the adverse party unless it clearly appears
from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified
complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the applicant before notice can be
served and a hearing had thereon. Every temporary
restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed
with the date and hour of issuance; and shall be filed
forthwith in the clerkfs office and entered of record; shall
define the injury and state why it is irreparable and why the
order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its
terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as
the court fixes, unless within the time so fixed the order,
for good cause shown, is extended for a like period or unless
the party against whom the order is directed consents that it
may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the
extension shall be entered of record. In case a temporary
restraining order is granted without notice, the motion for a
preliminary injunction shall be set down for hearing at the
earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters
except older matters of the same character; and when the
motion comes on for hearing the party who obtained the
temporary restraining order shall proceed with the
application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not
do so, the court shall dissolve the temporary restraining
order. On 2 days1 notice to the party who obtained the
temporary restraining order without notice or on such shorter
notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse
party may appear and move its dissolution or modification and
in that event the court shall proceed to hear and determine
such motion as expeditiously as the ends of justice require.
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Rule 69.
•

Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto.

• • •

(e)

Proceedings on sale of property.
•

• • •

(4) Purchaser refusing to pay. Every bid shall be
deemed an irrevocable offer; and if the purchaser refuses to
pay the amount bid by him for the property struck off to him
at a sale under execution, the officer may again sell the
property at any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss
is occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in addition
to being liable on such bid, is guilty of a contempt of court
and may be punished accordingly. When a purchaser refuses to
pay, the officer may also, in his discretion, thereafter
reject any other bid of such person.

(f)

Redemption from sale.
•

• • •

(3) Time for redemption; amount to be paid. The
property may be redeemed from the purchaser within six months
after the sale on paying the amount of his purchase with 6
percent thereon in addition, together with the amount of any
assessment or taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire
insurance and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any
improvements upon the property which the purchaser may have
paid thereon after the purchase, with interest on such
amounts, and, if the purchaser is also a creditor having a
lien prior to that of the person seeking redemption, other
than the judgment under which said purchase was made, the
amount of such lien, with interest.
In the event there is a disagreement as to whether
any sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or proper, the
person seeking redemption may pay the amount necessary for
redemption, less the amount in dispute, to the court out of
which execution or order authorizing the sale was issued, and
at the same time file with the court a petition setting forth
the item or items demanded to which he objects, together with
his grounds of objection; and thereupon the court shall enter
an order fixing a time for hearing of such objections. A
copy of the petition and order fixing time for hearing shall
be served on the purchaser not less than two days before the
day of hearing. Upon the hearing of the objections the court
shall enter an order determining the amount required for
redemption. In the event an additional amount to that
therefore paid to the clerk is required, the person seeking
•vii

redemption shall pay to the clerk such additional amount
within 7 days. The purchaser shall forthwith execute and
deliver a proper certificate of redemption upon being paid
the amount required by the court for redemption.
•

• • •

(6) Rents during period of redemption. The
purchaser from the time of sale until a redemption, and a
redemptioner from the time of his redemption until another
redemption, is entitled to receive from the tenant in
possession the rents of the property sold or the value of the
use and occupation thereof. But when any rents or profits
have been received by the judgment creditor or purchaser, or
his or their assigns, from the property thus sold preceding
such redemption, the amounts of such rents and profits shall
be a credit upon the redemption money to be paid; and if the
redemptioner or judgment debtor, before the expiration of the
time allowed for such redemption, demands in writing of such
purchaser or creditor, or his assigns, a written and verified
statement of the amounts of such rents and profits thus
received, the period for redemption is extended five days
after such sworn statement is given by such purchaser or his
assigns to such redemptioner or debtor. If such purchaser or
his assigns shall for a period of one month from and after
such demand, fail or refuse to give such statement, such
redemptioner or debtor may, within sixty days after such
demand, bring an action to compel an accounting and
disclosure of such rents and profits, and until fifteen days
from and after the final determination of such action the
right of redemption is extended to such redemptioner or
debtor.
(g)

Remedies of purchaser.

(1) For waste. Until the expiration of the time
allowed for redemption, the court may restrain the commission
of waste on the property, upon motion, with or without
notice, of the purchaser, or his successor in interest. But
it is not waste for the person in possession of the property
at the time of sale, or entitled to possession afterwards,
during the period allowed for redemption, to continue to use
it in the same manner in which it was previously used, or to
use it in the ordinary course of husbandry, or to make the
necessary repairs or (sic) buildings thereon or to use wood
or timber on the property therefor, or for the repair of
fences, or for fuel for his family while he occupies the
property. After his estate has become absolute, the
purchaser or his successor in interest may maintain an action
to recover damages for injury to the property by the tenant
in possession after sale and before possession is delivered
under the conveyance.

-viii-

(2) Where purchaser fails to obtain possession of
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom.
Where, because of irregularities in the proceedings
concerning the sale, or because the property sold was not
subject to execution and sale, or because of the reversal or
discharge of the judgment, a purchaser of property sold on
execution, or his successor in interest, fails to obtain the
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom, the
court having jurisdiction thereof shall, on motion of such
party and after such notice to the judgment creditor as the
court may prescribe, enter judgment against such judgment
creditor for the price paid by the purchaser, together with
interest. In the alternative, if such purchaser or his
successor in interest, fails to recover possession of any
property or is dispossessed thereof or evicted therefrom in
consequence of irregularity in the proceedings concerning the
sale, or because the property sold was not subject to
execution and sale, the court having jurisdiction thereof
shall, on motion of such party and after such notice to the
judgment debtor as the court may prescribe, revive the
original judgment in the name of the petitioner for the
amount paid by such purchaser at the sale, with interest
thereon from the time of payment at the same rate that the
original judgment bore; and the judgment so revived shall
have the same force and effect as would an original judgment
of the date of the revival.

-ix-

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

PATRICIA HUSTON, Trustee of
Trust A and Trust B under the
Will of John Huston, deceased,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No. 89-0476

A. R. SPAULDING and JOYCE
SPAULDING, and RUSSELL R.
LEWIS and MITZI LEWIS,
Defendants-Appellants,

vs.
STATE LINE PROPERTIES INC.,
Purchaser at Sheriff*s
Sale and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This appeal arises from the attempt by the defendants,
Russell R. Lewis and Mitzi Lewis (hereinafter "Lewises") to
redeem

real

property

from

a

sheriff's

sale

after

the

purchaser at the sheriff's sale, State Line Properties Inc.
(hereinafter "State Line"), had demolished improvements on
the

property.

Lewises

obtained

a

bid

to

restore

the

improvements, deposited $50,000.00 in court to redeem the
1

property, and obtained from the court an extension of the
time to redeem and an order setting a hearing to determine
the amount required to redeem.
to

dissolve

the

extension

State Line then filed motions

and

to strike the hearing

to

determine the amount required to redeem.

Disposition in the Lower Court
Without holding a hearing to determine the redemption
amount, the lower court on October 2, 1989, ordered Lewises
to deposit the full amount demanded by State Line to redeem
($256,000.00) by 5:00 P.M. the next day, October 3, 1989, or,
should they fail to do so, their right to redeem would be
terminated.

Although Lewises had previously obtained the

funds to pay the full amount demanded by State Line, they
were unable to obtain a release of all the conditions on the
availability
imposed by

of

those

the court.

funds within

one-day

deadline

The court then entered

an order

terminating their redemption rights.

the

This appeal followed.

Statement of Facts
On June 21, 1967, John and Patricia Huston sold the
property

involved

in

this

action

(a motel

property

in

Wendover, Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "motel" or
"property") to A. R. and Joyce Spaulding pursuant to a real
estate contract providing for deferred payments over fifteen
years (R.16).

On May 15, 1970, the Spauldings resold the

2

motel to the Lewises pursuant to another deferred-payment
contract.

On December 16, 1977, the Lewises resold the motel

(excluding some of the adjacent ground) to Marcia S. Merrill
pursuant to a third deferred-payment contract
1984 Merrill

(R.520).

In

failed to make the payments due the Lewises

which resulted in defaults in the payments due Spauldings and
Hustons.

Patricia Huston, as trustee under trusts under the

will of John Huston, to which the Hustons' interest in the
property had passed, commenced an action to foreclose the
Huston-Spaulding contract as a note and mortgage, joining the
Spauldings, Lewises and Merrill as defendants since they held
interests in the motel (R.23).
On January 27, 1989, a Decree of Foreclosure was entered
providing for the sale of the motel by the Sheriff (R.496).
On February 28, 1989, the Sheriff of Tooele County sold the
motel to State Line for $210,000.00

(R.574, Para. 1).

Up

until the time of the sheriff's sale, the motel had been used
and

operated

as a motel, generating

(R.528, Para. 3).

income to the owner

The Lewises intended to redeem the motel

from the sheriff's sale in order to continue the operation of
the motel business.

They had previously operated the motel

(R.528, Para. 6) and were then also operating another motel
on nearby property.
State Line took possession of the motel property and
commenced to demolish many of the buildings and to dismantle
electrical

equipment

on

the

property

3

(R.528,

para. 4).

Lewises, by letter from their attorney on March 17, 1989,
notified State Line of their right to redeem the property and
that the demolition of the buildings on the property was in
violation of their rights as potential
Recognizing

that

its

immediately

ceased

actions

any

were

further

redeeming parties.

wrongful,

demolition

of

State

Line

the

motel

property (R.592, Para. 2).
On August 24, 1989, Lewises, by hand-delivered letter
from their attorney to State Line and by mail to the Sheriff,
informed State Line and the Sheriff of their intent to redeem
the property

and

amounts required

requested

an

to redeem

itemized

less the

statement

amounts

repair the damage caused by State Line,

of the

required

to

Request was also

made for a verified written statement of rents and profits
since the sheriff's sale (R. 592, Para. 3). When no response
to their requests had been received by August 28, 1989, the
day

the

redemption

period

would

otherwise

have

expired,

Lewises decided to take three alternative actions: (1) They
filed with the court a Rule 6(b) Motion to Extend Time for
Redemption

from

sheriff's

sale

(R.505),

supported

by

an

affidavit (R.516) and a memorandum of law (R.511); (2) They
filed

a

Rule

Reasonableness

69(f)(3)

Petition

or Propriety

for

Determination

of Redemption Amount

of

(R.524),

supported by an affidavit (R.529) and a bid showing the cost
to repair the demolition damages of $388,000.00 (R.539); (3)
They deposited $50,000.00 cash in court (R.540-5) to redeem

4

the property

from

sherifffs

sale, not knowing the amount

required to redeem but figuring that, since their bid to
repair

the

damage

exceeded

the

$210,000.00

paid

at

the

sheriff's sale thus leaving nothing due to redeem, $50,000.00
would demonstrate their good faith and ability to redeem and
provide a substantial "cushion" in the event the court did
not accept the costs to repair in full.

The court granted

the motion to extend the time to redeem and extended the
redemption period until October 10, 1989

(R.504) and also

issued

of Petition

an Order Fixing Time

for Hearing

for

Determination of Reasonableness or Propriety of Redemption
Amount, setting a hearing for September 27, 1989

(R.548).

Copies of these orders and the supporting documents were
hand-delivered

that

day to

State Line's registered

agent

(R.503, 508, 514, 522, 527, 544, 547).
After filing these documents and obtaining these orders
in Tooele County, the attorney for Lewises returned to his
office at 6:00 P.M. on August 28, 1989 and found a statement
from State Line's attorneys asserting that $256,599.45 was
required
including

to

redeem

the property

$14,134.20

for

the

(R.592, Para.

costs

of

4, R.579)

demolishing

the

property, which were claimed to be for repairs, maintenance,
and securing the property.
At 5:30 P.M. on September 6, 1989, State Line delivered
to Lewises' attorney a Motion to Dissolve the Court's Order
Extending

Redemption

Period,
5

along

with

a

supporting

affidavit and memorandum, and a Notice setting a hearing on
that motion fir September 8, 1989 at 9:30 A.M. (R.592, Para.
6) •

These documents were not filed with the court until

after the hearing on September 8, 1989
588).

(R.552, 575, 584,

on September 7, 1989, Lewises hand-delivered to State

Line's

attorney

an

Objection

to

Hearing

(R.590)

and

supporting affidavit (R.543) objecting to such a hearing on
less than two days1

notice and without an opportunity to

respond to the affidavit and memorandum.
Despite Lewises' objections to the hearing on such short
notice, the court held the hearing on September 8, 1989 and
ordered from the bench that Lewises pay $260,000.00 into an
interest-bearing

account

within

five

days

and

"then

the

redemption period will continue until the 27th [September 27,
1989], or until the date that the matter is heard by the
court to make the determination as far as any waste on the
property"

(R.660, p. 3, 1. 9-16).

On September 18, 1989,

State Line submitted to Lewises1 attorney a proposed order on
State Line Properties Inc.'s Motion to Dissolve the Court's
Order Extending Redemption Period, which included language
that went beyond the court's bench ruling (R.615).

Lewises

filed objections to the proposed order on September 19, 1989
(R.596).

On September 26, 1989, State Line filed

Motion to

Strike Hearing of September 27, 1989 (R.628) and set that
motion

and

Lewises' objections to the proposed order for

hearing on October 2, 1989 (R.636).
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The court had informed

counsel by telephone that the hearing on September 27, 1989
could

not

be held

because

a criminal

matter would

take

priority on that day.
The Lewises were not able to pay the $260,000.00 into an
interest-bearing account within the five days ordered by the
court but on September 29, 1989, they arranged for a loan of
$210,000,00 from a lender who insisted on placing the funds
in escrow with Merrill Title Company
The vice president

(R.642, Para. 6 & 7) .

of Merrill Title Company

submitted an

affidavit confirming that he had $210,000.00 in escrow for
the purpose of redeeming the property subject to obtaining a
first lien on the property and on obtaining certificates of
title to certain listed vehicles and an airplane (R.646).
On October 2, 1989, the court ruled from the bench that
Lewises must deposit $256,000.00 in escrow subject only to
delivery of good title to the motel property to Lewises by
5:00 P.M. the next day, October 3, 1989, or their right to
redeem would be terminated (R.661, p.38).

Within that short

time period, Lewises were unable to remove the condition on
release of the escrowed funds with respect to delivery of
certificates

of

title

to

the vehicles

and

the

airplane

because the lender of those funds insisted on a report from
the

Federal

Registry
airplane.

Aviation

Administration

Airman

and

Aircraft

in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the title to the
Such a report requires several days to obtain.
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Therefore, the court signed the Order of October 13, 1989,
terminating the Lewises1 right of redemption (R.655).

This

appeal followed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Extension of the redemption period was appropriate.

The

redemption period following a sheriff's sale is set by Rule
69(f)(3), U.R.C.P., and that period may be extended under
Rule 6(b) with or without motion or notice for cause shown
upon request before the expiration of the redemption period.
The adverse effect on Lewises1 ability to redeem caused by
State Line's wrongful demolition of the improvements on the
property is sufficient cause to justify such an extension.
The

deposit

of

$50,000.00

cash

with

the

court

and

the

Lewises' attempt In have the court immediately determine the
redemption price demonstrated their good faith and ability to
redeem.

The lower court properly exercised its equitable

powers in extending the redemption period

for forty-three

days to October 10, 1989.

II.

The subsequent termination of the redemption rights was

in error.
the

The lower court was in error when it terminated

Lewises1

right

of

redemption

based

on

State

Line's

untimely motion to dissolve the extension filed under Rule
65A, which governs restraining orders and injunctions, and on
State Line's motion to strike the hearing to determine the
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redemption

price.

Forcing

Lewises

to

deposit

the

full

$256,000.00 demanded by State Line within five days, in the
first instance, and within one day, in the second instance,
without holding a hearing to determine what the redemption
price should be, was completely contrary to the principles of
equity which govern the foreclosure and redemption process.
Although

the

Lewises

could

not

comply

exactly

with

the

court's arbitrary rulings, they did demonstrate the ability
to pay the full amount demanded by State Line, despite State
Line's destruction of the security for the redemption money.
The court

erred

in terminating their right of redemption

before the conditions on the use of the redemption money
could

be

removed,

before

a

hearing

to

determine

the

redemption price, and before the expiration of the redemption
period as extended by the court.

III.

Rule 69ffW3) provides the means to equitably resolve

the dispute.

The essential issue in this case is how to deal

with State Line's wrongful demolition of the improvements on
the foreclosed property and its effect on Lewises' right of
redemption.
wrong.

State Line should not benefit

from

its own

Rule 69(f)(3) provides the means of quickly resolving

disputes

over

the

redemption

price

and

the

equitable

principles of set-off and recoupment allow Lewises to recoup
the costs of repair and restoration against the redemption
price since the claim for recoupment arises out of the same
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transaction or proceeding that gives rise to the right of
State

f

Line

n

receive

the

redemption

money.

The

same

proceeding which determines "the amount of taxes, insurance
premiums, repairs, maintenance and security paid during the
redemption period, as additions to the redemption price, is
appropriate to determine the amount of rents and profits
received from, and damage done to, the property during the
redemption period, as deductions from the redemption price.
Both elements of such determination are unliquidated until
determined

by

the

proceeded

with

its

court.

The

scheduled

lower
hearing

court
to

should

determine

have
all

elements of the redemption price.

IV.

Rule 69(g)(1) is not applicable to these parties nor to

these facts.

Rule 69(f)(3) is intended to protect redeeming

parties from improper demands made by the purchaser at the
sheriff's sale.

On the other hand, Rule 69(g)(1) is intended

to protect the purchaser against improper use or treatment of
the foreclosed property by a tenant in possession.

Rule

69(f)(3) is, therefore, the appropriate procedure to consider
the entire question of the redemption amount and to prevent
the purchaser from "clogging" the right of redemption.

By

purchasing at the sheriff's sale, State Line became a party
to this case and submitted itself to the rules which govern
it.

It is not entitled to force the Lewises to pay its

arbitrary, unliquidated demands and then pursue their claims
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for destruction
expensive

of the property

proceeding

which

in a separate,

may

result

lengthy,

only

uncollectible judgment against a shell corporation.
requires

that

total
one

relief

between

proceeding

and

these
Rule

in

an

Equity

parties
69(f)(3)

be

determined

in

has

established

a simple procedure to make that determination

without undue prejudice to either party.

V.
The

A full Role 69(fW31 hearing should be held on remand.
lower

court's

order

terminating

Lewises1

right

of

redemption should be reversed and this case remanded for a
determination of appropriate additions to and deductions from
the redemption

price.

Only then can equity between the

parties be done.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY EXTENDED THE TIME FOR
REDEMPTION FROM THE SHERIFFS SALE TO OCTOBER 10,
1989.
The statutory right of redemption from foreclosure sales
is established by §78-37-6, U.C.A., which provides:
"Sales of real estate under judgments of
foreclosure of mortgages and liens are subject to
redemption as in case of sales under executions
generally . . . "
Execution sales are governed by Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and Rule 69(f)(3) provides the time for redemption
as follows:
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"The property may be redeemed from the purchaser
within six months after the sale on paying the
amount of his purchase with 6% thereon in addition,
together with the amount of any assessment or
taxes, and any reasonable sum for fire insurance
and necessary maintenance, upkeep, or repair of any
improvements on the property which the purchaser
may have paid thereon after the purchase, with
interest on such amounts, and, if the purchaser is
also a creditor having a lien prior to that of the
person seeking redemption, other than the judgment
under which said purchase was made, the amount of
such lien, with interest•"
Extensions of the time periods set forth in the various Rules
of Civil Procedure are governed by Rule 6(b), which provides:
"When by these rules or by a notice given
thereunder or by order of the court an act is
required or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown may at
any time in its discretion (1) with or without
motion or notice order the period enlarged if
request therefor is made before the expiration of
the period originally prescribed or as extended by
a previous order, or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act
to be done where the failure to act was the result
of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the
time for taking any action under Rule 50(b), 52(b),
59(b), (d) , and (e) , 60(b) and 73(a) and (g) ,
except to the extent and under the conditions
stated in them."
Therefore, the court has authority to extend the time
for redemption under Rule 69(f)(3) "with or without motion or
notice" for cause shown if request therefor is made before
the expiration of the redemption period ajid even thereafter
for excusable neglect upon motion and notice.

Since that

period expired at the end of the day six months from February
28, 1989, or August 28, 1989, a request made before the end
of the day on August 28, 1989, could be granted ex parte.
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In this case the redemption right of Lewises had been
prejudiced by the actions of State Line, the purchaser at the
sheriff!s sale, in demolishing and dismantling improvements
on the property.

Lewises have a right to redeem the property

and take it in the condition it was in at the time of the
sheriff's sale.

The property was an operating motel at the

time of the sheriff's sale and the demolition terminated that
use.

Lewises

have

been

prevented

from

taking

over

an

operating motel business and have also been hindered in their
efforts to obtain funds to redeem the property.

Lenders who

would readily advance funds to an operating business would
not do so on a property in a state of destruction.

The cost

to repair the damage done by State Line, according to the bid
obtained by the Lewises, added $388,000.00 to the $256,000.00
cost

of

redeeming

the

property.

That

would,

and

did,

discourage lenders who were otherwise prepared to advance the
redemption money.

The demolition by State Line constitutes

sufficient cause under Rule 6(b)(1) and was such a detriment
to the position of Lewises that the equitable powers of the
court were

properly

exercised

to protect

their right

of

redemption.
This court, in Molleruo v. Storage Systems Int'l. 569
P.2d

1122

(Utah

1977),

has

recognized

the

lower

court's

authority, under Rule 6(b), to extend the redemption period
for cause.

While it was determined that cause did not exist

in that case, this court stated, at 1124:
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"A court, sitting in equity, may in appropriate
instances extend the period.
This court has
recognized that equitable principle by setting
aside a sale after the time for redemption had
expired, when the sale was attended by such
substantial irregularities as must have prevented a
sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross sacrifice
of the judgment creditor's property.
A similar
case can be made to relieve a mortgagor of the
consequences of fraud, accident, mistake, or
waiver, as is found to exist in United States v.
Loosley. 551 P.2d 506 (Utah 1976).
The equitable principles set forth in that case certainly
apply here to preserve Lewises' right of redemption in the
face of the inequitable conduct of State Line in demolishing
the improvements on the property.
State Line has argued in the lower court and on this
appeal that Lewises simply

appeared ex parte asserting a

self-serving dispute over the demolition as a means to buy
time to raise the redemption money and that they should be
turned away as was the trustee for the debtor in Mollerup.
But in Mollerup. the party attempting to redeem had not been
hindered in the redemption process by the wrongful conduct of
the purchaser at the sheriff's sale.

Instead, he came in

after the redemption period expired and admitted he had made
no tender of money, had no ability to redeem, and sought the
extension solely for the purpose of buying time to sell the
right of redemption in an improving real estate market.

In

this

in

case,

the

Lewises

actually

deposited

$50,000.00

court, which was substantially more than they thought would
be required to redeem, sought to have an immediate hearing to
determine the amount required to redeem, and demonstrated an
14

ability to obtain the entire $256,000.00 demanded by State
Line in spite of the wrongful conduct of State Line which
made

it

extremely

difficult

redemption money.

for

Lewises

to

raise

the

The Lewises were prepared and able to

redeem and would have done so even if their claimed offset
were denied in full.

They would have paid the full amount

demanded within thirty days if given a reasonable opportunity
to do so.
This case is clearly distinguishable from the holding of
Mollerup but just as clearly comes within the principles
enunciated

in

Mollerup.

redemption

period

in

That

case

"appropriate

would

extend

instances11

the

including

"irregularities . . . resulting in a gross sacrifice of the
. . . property" and "fraud, accident, mistake, or waiver, as
is found to exist in United States v. Looslev."

State Line

would limit the "appropriate instances" to fraud, mistake,
accident, or waiver.

It is possible that the acts involved

here could constitute fraud, mistake, accident, or waiver.
hearing would be required to determine that.

A

But, it is

interesting to note that those four terms were included in
the

Mollerup

Loosley,

opinion

551 P.2d

redemption

was

by

506

upheld

reference

to

United

States

v.

(Utah 1976), wherein the attempted
not

because

of

fraud,

mistake,

accident, or waiver but only because the refusal to accept
the

tendered

redemption

money

was

based

on

the

"technicalities" of having failed to include the certified
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copy of the mortgage or lien and the affidavit showing the
amount due on the lien and delivery of the redemption money
to the wrong

person.

Obviously,

"appropriate

instances"

include the kind of wrongful activity of State Line in this
case,

who,

for

all

we

know

at

this

point,

may

have

intentionally destroyed the improvements on the property in
an attempt to make it impossible for Lewises to redeem.
The grounds to justify an extension of the redemption
period exist in this case and the lower court, exercising its
equitable powers, acted properly in granting an extension for
only forty-three days.

In fact, because of the inequitable

conduct of State Line, the court, in order to do equity, had
no other choice.

POINT II
HAVING PROPERLY EXTENDED THE REDEMPTION PERIOD, THE
LOWER COURT WAS IN ERROR IN TERMINATING THAT
EXTENSION BY ITS ARBITRARY BENCH RULINGS OF
SEPTEMBER 8 AND OCTOBER 2, 1989 AND ITS ORDER OF
OCTOBER 13f 1989.
The Order Extending Redemption Period was hand-delivered
to State Linefs attorneys on August
later,

on

September

6,

1989, at

28, 1989.

5:30

P.M.,

Ten days

they

served

Lewises1 attorney with a Motion to Dissolve the Court's Order
Extending Redemption Period and with a notice setting the
hearing of that motion for 9:30 A.M. on September 8, thus
effectively giving only one-day's notice.

They also served

an affidavit and a 16-page memorandum, indicating that they
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had spent some time, possibly several days, planning their
"last-minute"

motion.

Their

memorandum

argued

that

the

extension operated as a restraining order and that they were
entitled to proceed under Rule 65A to dissolve the extension
on two-days' notice.

Their argument ignored the fact that

they had not given even two-days1

notice.

Lewises filed

objections to their hearing based on the lack of adequate
notice under Rule 65A(b), which requires two-days' notice,
and Rule 6(d), which requires five-days' notice, and Rule
4-501, Code of Judicial Administration, which requires ten
days to respond.
Despite those objections and without examining any of
the affidavits or memoranda, since they were not filed until
after the hearing, the court heard the motion and arbitrarily
ordered from the bench that Lewises pay $260,000.00 into an
interest-bearing

account

within

five

days

and

"then

the

redemption period will continue until the 27th, or until the
date that the matter is heard by the court . . . ."

Thus,

the court reduced the previously granted extension to five
days, making it virtually impossible to raise the redemption
money.

This was based on State Line's motion to dissolve a

temporary restraining order under Rule 65A.

State Line did

not even comply with Rule 65A because that rule requires at
least two-days' notice unless the court prescribes a shorter
notice.
rule

was

See Rule 65A(b).
entirely

But, State Line's reliance on that

misplaced.

Lewises
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did

not

obtain a

temporary restraining order and did not attempt to comply
with the requirements of that rule and State Line was not
restrained

from

doing

anything.

Rather,

the

Lewises

proceeded under Rule 6(b) to extend the redemption period.
That Rule 6(b) authorizes such an extension is clear not only
on the face of the rule but also from this court's opinion in
Mollerup, which approved the reliance on Rule 6(b) even if it
found that the requirements of Rule 6(b) had not been met.
State Line's motion under Rule 65A was entirely out of order.
Furthermore, the court's consideration of that motion, or any
motion, without compliance with Rule 6(d), which requires at
least five-days' notice for a hearing on a motion, or with
Rule

4-501

would

of the Code of Judicial Administration, which

allow Lewises ten days to respond

affidavit

and memorandum,

was

to State Line's

an error which

this

court

should correct.
Ten days later, on September

18, 1989, State Line's

attorney submitted a proposed Order on State Line Properties
Inc.'s

Motion

to

Dissolve

the

Court's

Order

Extending

Redemption Period to which Lewises filed objections.
September

26, 1989, State Line

Then on

filed a Motion to Strike

Hearing of September 27, 1989 and set that motion and the
Lewises' objections for hearing on October 2, 1989.

In the

meantime, the Lewises had arranged for a $210,000.00 loan
from

a

lender

who

insisted

on escr owing

the

funds with

Merrill Title Company until he could be given a first lien on
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the motel and on five automobiles and an airplane owned by
Lewises.
court.

Affidavits confirming this loan were filed with the

On October 2, 1989, the lower court again ignored its

prior orders extending the redemption period and setting a
hearing to determine the redemption amount and arbitrarily
ordered Lewises to remove all conditions on the use of the
escrowed funds, except the granting of a first lien on the
motel, by 5:00 P.M. the next day.

That ruling stated that

the Lewises' redemption rights would be terminated if they
failed

to

remove

those

conditions.

This placed

another

impossible requirement on the Lewises since they could not
persuade the lender to remove these conditions without a
report on the title to the airplane which required several
days

to

obtain

from

Oklahoma

City.

Thus,

the

court

terminated Lewises' redemption rights without a hearing to
determine the redemption amount and without allowing them
until October 10, 1989 to redeem as provided in its order of
August 28, 1989.
The impropriety

of the lower court's action was, of

course, its response to the pressure applied by State Line in
claiming that its own rights were being violated since it was
delayed in getting a sheriff's deed to the property.

The

easy answer to State Line's claim is that, if it had not
filed its motions and had allowed the court to proceed with
its hearing

on the

petition

to determine

the

redemption

amount, the whole matter would have been resolved on or prior
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to October 10, 1989.

Any delay beyond those 43 days is its

own fault and now that delay is continued by the necessity of
this appeal.

It has itself to blame for any prejudice to its

position beyond that minimal delay.
A more thorough response to State Line's claim that its
rights are abridged requires a consideration of the purposes
of the

rules governing

the redemption

procedure.

Those

purposes are set forth in United States v. Looslev, 551 P.2d
506 (Utah 1976), at 508:
"[T]here are certain principles relating to
mortgages and their foreclosure to be considered.
The main purpose of a mortgage is to insure the
payment of the debt for which is (sic) stands as
security; and foreclosure is allowed when necessary
to carry out that objective. But foreclosure is in
the nature of a forfeiture, which the law does not
favor. The proceeding is one in equity in which
principles of equity should be applied consistent
with the above stated purpose; and neither the
mortgage nor the foreclosure should be used as an
instrument of oppression.
Accordingly, the law
provides for the six-month redemption period to
give the debtor an opportunity to pay his debt and
salvage his property.
"Consistent with the foregoing, rules and
statutes dealing with redemption are regarded as
remedial in character and should be given liberal
construction and application to permit a property
owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make
his creditor whole, and save his property.
Therefore, if a debtor, acting in good faith, has
substantially
complied with the procedural
requirements of the rule in such a manner that the
lender mortgagee is not injured or adversely
affected, and is getting what he is entitled to,
the law will not aid in depriving the mortgagor of
his property for mere falling short of exact
compliance with technicalities."
United

States v.

Looslev

involved

a purchaser

at a

sheriff's sale who refused to accept a tender of redemption
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by the assignee of the debtors.

Our case is similar in that

State Line, as the purchaser at the sheriff's sale, also does
not want to accept a redemption and is doing everything in
its power to prevent a redemption—from demolishing improvements to filing spurious motions.

As in Looslev, the rules

should

liberally

be

construed

and

applied

debtor to "save his property."

to permit

the

Lewises have acted in good

faith both in attempting to obtain a determination of the
redemption amount and in attempting to pay that amount.

They

first deposited $50,000.00 in court even though they didn't
believe they owed anything because of the demolition on the
property.

They then sought to have the court determine the

amount required to redeem within thirty days.1

When they

were placed "under the gun" (R.661, p.42-3) by the court's
orders to deposit the full amount demanded by State Line, in
five days in the first instance and overnight in the second
instance, they did their best to comply even though those
orders were unfair, at least in view of the difficulty of
raising money on the property as demolished by State Line.
Those orders merely assisted State Line in its efforts to
prevent a redemption.

When the Lewises have acted in good

faith, especially under difficult circumstances not of their
own making, "the law [should] not aid in depriving [them] of

x

Under Rule 69(f)(3), this hearing could# have been set
on two-days' notice but Lewises wanted to give State Line
plenty of time to prepare for the hearing (R.662, p.13-14).
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[their] property for mere falling short of exact compliance
with technicalities"

(Looslev at 508).

In this case, the

lower court's orders have aided in depriving the Lewises of
their property.

The principles set forth in Looslev would

require that the court abide by its original extension to
October 10, 1989 and that it hold a hearing to determine the
amount required to redeem.

That would have given them a

reasonable opportunity to save their property and would not
have prejudiced State Line in any way since their receipt of
the redemption price or the sheriff's deed would not have
been delayed more than 43 days.
The equitable principles which govern the
process

require

that

the

redemption

lower court's order terminating

Lewises' right of redemption without a hearing to determine
the redemption amount and without allowing them the time to
redeem as originally extended be reversed.

POINT III
LEWISES WERE ENTITLED TO A HEARING UNDER RULE
69(f)(3) TO DETERMINE THE REASONABLENESS OR
PROPRIETY OF THE REDEMPTION AMOUNT AND WERE
ENTITLED TO OFFSET OR RECOUP AGAINST THE REDEMPTION
PRICE THE COST TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE TO THE PROPERTY
DONE BY STATE LINE.
Although the motions filed by State Line and the rulings
thereon by the lower court were improper and resulted in an
inequitable termination of the Lewises' right of redemption,
they

are

not

diversionary

the

crux

of

this

proceeding.

They

were

tactics by State Line to divert the court's
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attention away from the crucial issue of how to deal with the
wrongful

conduct

of

State

improvements on the property.

Line

in

demolishing

the

That conduct made redemption

by Lewises extremely difficult, if not virtually impossible,
because it deprived them of the use of an operating motel as
collateral for the redemption money.
court

deal

with

this

wrongful

How then should the

conduct

in

an

equitable

proceeding the purpose of which is "to give the debtor an
opportunity
Loosleyf

to

pay

at 508.

his

debt

and

salvage

his

property"?

The general answer to that question, as

stated in Loosley, is to construe and apply the "rules and
statutes dealing

with

redemption"

liberally

"to permit a

property owner who can pay his debts to do so, and thus make
his creditor whole and save his property."

The specific

answer to that question is to allow the Lewises to offset
against

the

redemption

price

the

cost

of

restoring

repairing the damage done to the property by State Line.

or
Any

other answer would place the burden of State Line's wrongful
conduct on the Lewises and allow State Line to benefit from
its own wrong, which is contrary to the principles of equity.
"No one should benefit

from his own wrong."

Prudential

Federal Savings and Loan Ass, v. William L. Pereira and Ass.,
16 U.2d 365, 401 P.2d 439 (1965), at 441; Park v. Jameson, 12
U.2d 141, 364 P.2d 1 (1961), at 4; McCormick v. Life Ins.
Corp. of America, 6 U.2d 170, 308 P.2d 949 (1957).
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Rule 69(f)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides a
means of quickly resolving disputes over the redemption price
which is demanded by the purchaser at the sheriff's sale.

It

provides, in the second paragraph:
"In the event there is a disagreement as to whether
any sum demanded for redemption is reasonable or
proper, the person seeking redemption may pay the
amount necessary for redemption, less the amount in
dispute, to the court . . . and at the same time
file with the court a petition setting forth the
item or items demanded to which he objects,
together with his grounds for objection; . . . Upon
the hearing of the objections the court shall enter
an order determining the amount required for
redemption.
In the event an additional amount to
that theretofore paid to the clerk is required, the
person seeking redemption shall pay to the clerk
such additional amount within 7 days." (emphasis
supplied)
It is true that the prior paragraph of Rule 69(f)(3)
lists only items which may be added to the redemption price
and not items to be deducted therefrom.2

But this does not

mean that the person seeking redemption may only object to
such additional items.

The rule allows for an objection to

any sum demanded by the purchaser, including "the amount of
his purchase."

It seems only "reasonable [and] proper" that

the amount of his purchase be reduced by any offset to which
the party seeking redemption is equitably entitled because of
the wrongful conduct of the purchaser.

2

Rule 69(f)(6) does allow for credits against the
redemption price for rents and profits and provides a
procedure to obtain an accounting if the purchaser fails to
deliver a statement of such rents and profits.
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The equitable principles of set-off and recoupment are
discussed and applied in Freston v. Gulf Oil Co.. 565 P.2d
787

(Utah 1977), in which it was held that the defendant

could withhold from the plaintiffs royalty payments under an
oil and gas lease in order to recoup prior overpayments under
In responding to the plaintiffs1 claim that the

the lease.

overpayments had been spent and should not be returned, the
court stated, at 788:
11

• . • defendant has not asked for repayment, it
has merely looked to the future proceeds of the
lease to recoup the overpayment and plaintiffs are
not required to dig into their pocket and return
the overpayment in toto.

"In the absence

of a showing of prejudice, equity

requires a right of recoupment. . . . the trial
court did not err in ruling as a matter of law that
no such prejudicial circumstances existed or would
bar recoupment."
and also, at 789:
"It would be highly inequitable to allow plaintiffs
to retain something that was not theirs."
Likewise, in this case, there is no prejudice to State
Line

in

allowing

destruction
price.

caused

Lewises
by

State

to

recoup

Line

and

against

set
the

off

the

redemption

At most there would have been a delay of 43 days in

either payment of the redemption price to State Line or in
State Line's receipt of a sheriff's deed.
there would

On the other hand,

be a great deal of prejudice to Lewises if

recoupment or set-off is not allowed since that would result
in either a denial of their right to redeem (because State
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Line had made

it

impossible

to redeem) or in a lengthy

proceeding to recover from State Line the damages it caused
by its wrongful actions.

Equity, therefore, requires a right

of recoupment or set-off.
including

the

Mortgage foreclosure proceedings,

accompanying

rights

of

redemption,

are

equitable proceedings, Looslev, supra, and equity should be
done in such proceedings.
State Line argued below that the damages it caused to
Lewises could not be set-off against the redemption price
since those damages were unliquidated, relying on King v.
Firm,

3 U.2d

419,

285

P.2d

1114

(1955),

and Nutter v.

Occidental Pet. Land & Dev. Corp., 117 Ariz. 458, 573 P.2d
532 (1977).

It is interesting to note that the plaintiffs in

Freston v. Gulf Oil Co. also relied on King v. Firm in
support of their position against recoupment but this court
in Freston determined that King v. Firm had no application.
In fact, this court in King v. Firm stated that the reasons
for

not

allowing

the

offset

of

an unrelated

debt

on a

promissory note against rental due under the lease were that
the note "was not due at the time of the trial," (p.116) and
that the "tenant did not claim an offset but claimed that no
rent was owing" (p.118).

The court further stated, at 117:

"Thus under some circumstances a tenant would be
required to pay the rent or lose his rights to the
property under the lease although the landlord owed
him more money than the amount of the rent. This
possibly would not be so if it were undisputed that
there was presently due and owing from the landlord
to the tenant more money than the amount due and
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owing by the tenant on the rent and the tenant
definitely claimed the right to offset one claim
against the other." (emphasis supplied)
The tenant in that case was deprived of his tenancy but
the court, nevertheless, held that the balance due on the
note should be offset against the rent due and a judgment was
entered in favor of the tenant after deducting the amount of
the rent, thus granting the offset.
that

the

tenant

could

have

The court further stated

regained

possession

property but he did not seek that remedy.

of

the

See p. 1119.

Thus, King v. Firm is supportive of everything Lewises are
seeking in this action.
It is also important to note that the claimed offset for
the balance due on the note in King v. Firm did not arise out
of

the

tenant.

rental

arrangement

between

the

landlord

and

the

This is an important distinction made in many of the

cases dealing with the right of set-off.

For example, in

Nutter. supra, the other case relied on by State Line below,
the set-off for damages for breach of contract sought in a
case pending in another county was not allowed against the
amount due in a mortgage foreclosure action since they were
totally unrelated.

However, the court in Nutter stated, at

534:
11 f

. . . defendant may counterclaim or set off ^ a
claim or demand against plaintiff which is
connected with the mortgage transaction and affects
the consideration thereof . . .' Owen v. Mecham,
9 Ariz. App. 529 at 532, 454 P.2d 577 at 580
(1969).»
and also:
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"Claims for unliquidated damages have been held not
the proper subject matter of a setoff or
counterclaim in a mortgage foreclosure suit unless
some special equity exists in the pleader's favor,"
(emphasis supplied)
In Rooue River Mcrmt. Co. v. Shaw, 243 Ore. 54, 411 P.2d 440
(1966),

the

court

applications

of

explained
the

the

terms

different

"set-off,"

meanings

and

"recoupment"

and

"counterclaim," at pages 442-3:
"Recoupment is confined to matters arising out of
and connected with the transaction upon which the
action is brought . . . .
1,1

Set-off1 is not synonymous with recoupment only
in that it is a 'money demand by the defendant
against the plaintiff arising upon contract and

constituting a debt independent
of and unconnected
with
the
cause
of action
set forth in the
complaint.

Only 'counterclaim' permits affirmative relief . .
. .
Recoupment and set-off may be available as
defenses for the purpose of liquidating the whole
or part of plaintiff's claim in situations where an
independent action would not lie."
The court held that recoupment was available to the defendant
in that case even if a counterclaim was not since the right
of recoupment arose out of the transaction set forth in the
complaint.
While the terms recoupment and set-off are sometimes
used

interchangeably,

it

appears

that

the

right

of

recoupment, or set-off, is allowed if it arises out of the
transaction against which it is to be recouped or offset and
is further allowed, even if it is for an unliquidated amount,
if "there is some special equity
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. . .

in the pleader's

favor," Nutter. supra, at 534, or if there is "some equitable
ground for being protected against his adversary's demand."
Scarano v, Scarano. 132 N.J. Eq. 362, 28 A.2d 425 (1942), (a
case in which a set-off of an unrelated, unliquidated debt
was allowed in a mortgage foreclosure action) .

Some of the

equities which have been held to be grounds for allowance of
unliquidated

setoffs

are

fraud,

nonresidence

of a party,

insolvency or other "embarrassment in enforcing the demand at
law."

Caldwell v. Stevens, 64 Okl. 287, 167 Pac. 610 (1917),

at 612; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Midland Oil Co., 55 F.2d 42
(4th Cir. 1932); McFall v. Burley Tobacco Growers1 Co-op.
Ass'n, 246 Ky. 278, 54 S.W.2d 922 (1932).
Equity, of course, recognizes any ground which fairness
would

require

"adversary's

to be offset against
demand."

or recouped

from the

Since the demolition of the motel

property is the destruction of the essence of this action,
the asset which is to be preserved and protected in this
equitable foreclosure proceeding, and which is the property
to be redeemed by the Lewises, fairness dictates that Lewises
be

allowed

restoration

to

recoup

against

or

the

offset

the

redemption

cost

price.

of

repair

or

Furthermore,

Lewises1 right and ability to redeem has been prejudiced by
the destruction of the property and the business conducted on
that property.

Equity should intervene in such a case.

It

is clear, too, that the claim for recoupment or setoff arises
out

of

the

foreclosure

and

redemption
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process—the

same

transaction out of which State Line's right and demand for
the redemption price arose.

Therefore, setoff or recoupment

is warranted in this case under either ground set forth in
the cases discussed above.
State Line's argument below that the claimed offset is
unliquidated and, therefore, cannot be offset, while contrary
to

the

cases

unavailing
unliquidated.

and

because

principles
the

just

discussed,

redemption

price

is

itself

also
is

The purpose of the hearing provided for in

Rule 69(f)(3) is to determine the amount of the redemption
price and, until that determination is made, the redemption
price must be considered unliquidated.

The same process

required to determine that price can determine the amount of
any offset or recoupment.

And, especially if Lewises are

entitled to an equitable offset against the redemption price,
that redemption price cannot be considered liquidated until
that determination is made.
hearing

to

determine

the

If the lower court had held the
redemption

price

as

originally

scheduled on September 27, 1989, the amount of the redemption
price and of the costs to repair and restore would have been
fixed and liquidated

in advance of the expiration of the

extended redemption period on October 10, 1989 or of the
seven-day period for payment of additional amounts required
for redemption as set forth in Rule 69(f)(3).

It should be

remembered that Lewises had already obtained a bid to restore
the demolished property (R.530-9) and gave State Line plenty
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of time to do the same
remembered,

(R.662, p.13-14).

It should be

also, that part of the amount State Line was

demanding to redeem the property was $14,134.20 as its own
costs

incurred

in demolishing

the property

(R.379).

The

propriety and reasonableness of this amount still had to be
determined at a hearing based on evidence to be submitted by
State Line and, perhaps, challenged by Lewises.

Evidence of

the costs to repair or restore the demolished property could
easily and should logically have been considered at the same
hearing.
The fact that a hearing under Rule 69(f)(3) is, or can
be, an accelerated hearing without the benefit of the lengthy
discovery and trial preparation of other proceedings should
make no difference.

Counterclaims (and, therefore, setoffs

and recoupments (See Rogue River Meruit, supra) are allowed in
unlawful

detainer

proceedings.

actions,

which

are

also

accelerated

White v. District Court of Fourth Judicial

District. 120 Utah 173, 232 P.2d 785 (1951), in which this
court stated that to require a party to bring a separate
action to restrain the unlawful detainer action or to assert
the counterclaim:
" . . . would be inconsistent with the spirit and
purpose of the New Rules of Civil Procedure which
was to simplify and expedite procedure and to
consolidate litigation wherever that could^ be done
without confusion or prejudice to the rights of
litigants."
Other examples of accelerated proceedings could be given, the
most notable of which may be an application for a temporary
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restraining order or preliminary injunction.

It is well-

known that disputes are often resolved, rightly or wrongly,
by a preliminary

injunction, which can be obtained in as

little as ten days, since the court makes a determination as
to the likelihood that the applicant will prevail on the
merits.

In

recognition

of this, no

doubt,

the

Supreme

Court's Advisory Committee's Proposed Rules Modifications of
March 5, 1990 proposes that a trial on the merits may be
"advanced

and

application"

consolidated

for

65A(a) (2)

and

available

from

preliminary
(e)(4),

the

Utah

with

the

injunction.
Rules

Administrative

hearing

of

Proposed

of

Civil

Office

of

the
Rule

Procedure,
the Courts.

Thus, the time requirements for a hearing under Rule 69(f)(3)
is no justification for a refusal to consider Lewises' right
to an offset or recoupment against the redemption price.
The lower court had properly set a hearing to determine
the reasonableness and propriety of the redemption amount.
It should have proceeded to hear that matter including any
evidence the parties could produce with respect to the damage
done to the property
damage.

itself and the cost to repair that

The expenditures of State Line in causing the damage

should not be allowed as part of the redemption price and the
costs to repair the damage or to restore the property to the
condition it was in at the time of the sheriff's sale should
be deducted from that redemption price.
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POINT IV
THE REMEDY PROVIDED IN RULE 69(g) (1) DOES NOT APPLY
IN THIS CASE NOR DOES IT PRECLUDE AN OFFSET UNDER A
RULE 69(f)(3) DETERMINATION.
State Line argued below, and in its untimely motion for
summary disposition on appeal, that Lewises are limited to
the remedy for waste provided to the sheriff's sale purchaser
in Rule 69(g)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

One reason

asserted for that position by State Line is that it claims
Rule 69(g)(1) requires the commencement of a separate action
for waste and that it is entitled to the "due process" of
being served with a summons and complaint and of proceeding
"through

the

normal

process

of

litigation,

discovery and the usual trial preparation."

including

It claims that

it "has never been named as a party in this action nor has it
been served with a summons and complaint in any other action.
State Line is involved in this action only by virtue of its
being

a purchaser

at the sheriff's

sale."

Respondent's

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of its Motion
for Summary Disposition, pp. 4-5, 7-8.

State Line ignores

the fact that, once the purchaser's bid is accepted at the
sheriff's sale, "he submits himself to the jurisdiction of
the court and becomes a party to the cause in which the sale
has been decreed."

Allen v. Martin. 61 Miss. 78, (1883);

Dills v. Jasper. 33 111. 262, (1864); Traveler's Insurance
Co. v. Thompson. 140 Neb. 109, 299 N.W. 329 (1941).

State

Line, as the purchaser at the sheriff's sale, is subject to
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the jurisdiction of the court with respect to the property
purchased,

including proceedings to compel payment

of the

amount bid or for contempt under Rule 69(e)(4), motions for
restraining orders under Rule 69(g)(1), motions for judgment
against the judgment creditor or the judgment debtor under
Rule 69(g)(2), and petitions to determine the reasonableness
and propriety of the redemption amount under Rule 69(f)(3).
No separate summons and complaint and lengthy discovery or
trial proceedings are prescribed for any of these matters.
State Line has inserted itself into this case and must be
prepared to accept the rules which govern it, including those
which govern its own actions with respect to the property it
purchased,

knowing

that

redemption

and

delay

possession.

a

it

was

in,

subject

and

to

possible

rights
denial

of
of,

The "due process" provided to State Line by

scheduling a hearing on Lewises' petition in 30 days rather
than the two days allowed under Rule 69(f)(3) goes far beyond
the "undue process" of the one-day notice it gave to Lewises
on its Motion to Dissolve and the five days, and later one
day,

forced

insistence,
redemption.

on

Lewises

to deposit

by
the

the
full

court,

on

State

Line's

$256,000.00 demanded

for

State Line's concepts of due process seem to

vary depending upon the party against whom process is taken.
State Line takes a similar approach to its construction
of Rule 69.

It strictly construes the portions of Rule 69

which seem to favor it but will not allow a similar strict
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construction of the portions which may favor the Lewises.

It

insists that the provisions of Rule 69(f)(3) do not allow for
setoff or recoupment against the redemption price because
they are not expressly provided for therein.

Yet, it insists

that the terms "purchaser" and "tenant in possession" in Rule
69(g)(1) apply to Lewises and to State Line, respectively,
when, strictly construed,

Lewises, even if they redeemed,

would not be a "purchaser or his successor in interest" nor
would State Line be a "tenant in possession."

Rule 69(g)(1)

was obviously not drafted in contemplation of a destruction
of the property by the purchaser in violation of the rights
of redemption.

Rather,

it was meant to deal with waste

committed by a party already in possession of the property,
who could be the judgment debtor or his tenant, in violation
of

the

69(g)(1)

rights
was

of

the

intended

purchaser.
to

It

protect

the

appears

that

purchaser

at

Rule
the

sheriff's sale while Rule 69(f)(3) was intended to protect
the redeeming parties.

It is far more logical, therefore, to

allow Lewises to proceed under Rule 69(f)(3) to protect them
against the wrongs of State Line than it is to force them
under Rule 69(g)(1), which offers no protection against the
wrongful

conduct

of State Line but only prejudices their

rights.
The

inconsistency

of

State

Line's

position

is

also

apparent from its claim that Lewises have no rights under the
first

sentence of Rule

69(g)(1) to restrain waste before
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redemption but do have the right to sue for damages under the
last sentence of Rule 69(g)(1) after redemption (R.661, p.21,
1.19-20; p.33-34).

The words "purchaser or his successor in

interest" are given
accordance

with

different

the

result

meanings
it

wants

by

State

to

Line in

obtain.

This

inconsistency only underscores the fact that Rule 69(g)(1)
was intended to provide remedies to the purchaser and not to
redeeming parties.

On the other hand, Rule 69(f)(3) was

intended to provide remedies to redeeming parties.

The lack

of any setoff or recoupment language in Rule 69(f)(3) means
only that the drafters did not anticipate that a purchaser at
a

sheriff's

sale would

redemption period.
imagine

that

in

69(f)(3)

broad

is

redeeming

parties

purchaser,

during

the

In fact, it is difficult even now to

anyone

demonstrated

demolish the property

would

Point

do

III

above,

enough

to

against

the

especially

such

as

a

the

include

thing 1

But,

language

of

a

remedy

inequitable

it

applies

for

conduct

to

an

as

Rule
the

of the

equitable

proceeding where fairness should prevail over form.
State Line's unreasonable and inequitable interpretation
is

illustrated

more

fully

by

a

consideration

of

its

contention that Lewises' sole remedy is to first redeem by
paying everything demanded and then to sue for waste.

One

fact which Lewises have not yet been given an opportunity to
demonstrate is that they would have deposited into court on
August

28,

1989

the

full

$256,000.00
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which

State

Line

demanded for redemption except for the fact that State Line
destroyed

both

business

which

$256,000.00

the

physical

would

redemption

have

property
stood

money.

They

and

as

the

operating

security

spent

the

for

the

six-month

redemption period trying to raise the redemption money from
lenders who were willing to lend them the money secured by
the property, as it was, with the operating business thereon.
They were turned down because of the actions of State Line
(R.642, Para. 4).
State Line now takes the position that Lewises must be
able,

without

regard

to the

condition

and value

of the

property itself, to produce the $256,000.00 redemption money
or they must

forfeit their right of redemption and their

claim for waste on the property.
absolute title before they have
argument goes.

They must redeem and obtain
standing

to sue, so the

Surely, the right of redemption is not just

for the wealthy!
accounts as well.

It should protect those without huge bank
For property owners without large cash

reserves, the ability to redeem lies in the property itself
because that represents their ability to borrow the funds and
provide security therefor to their lenders.

The property

itself is, in a sense, the redemption money, especially when
the property is an operating business.

Remember that the

Lewises had previously operated that motel business and were,
at the time of the sheriff's sale and attempted redemption,
and still are, operating a similar motel on nearby property
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and they intended to resume the operation of the motel on
this property.

When State Line demolished the improvements

on the property, it deprived them of the redemption money.
To allow State Line to take the redemption money from Lewises
and

then

come

in to court

and

say

"too bad, you can't

redeem," would be to condone a crime.
Despite this attempt by State Line, intentional or not,
to frustrate Lewises' ability to redeem, Lewises have shown
good faith by depositing $50,000.00 cash with the court and
have demonstrated an ability to redeem at the full demanded
price, until the lower court cut their efforts short by its
one day "put up or shut-up" order of October 2, 1989.

The

law ought to give Lewises a reasonable opportunity to redeem
and, if the law doesn't provide such a remedy, surely equity
does.
The use of Rule 69(f)(3) to resolve the total question
of

the

redemption

recoupments,

price,

is entirely

cases in other states.

including

consistent

any

setoffs

or

with the holdings of

For example, in Cogswell v. Brown,

102 Wash. 625, 173 Pac. 623 (1918), the purchaser at the sale
entered into possession of the foreclosed land and "denuded
it of its merchantable timber."

When the mortgagor attempted

to

removed

offset

the

value

of

the

timber

against

the

redemption price, the purchaser argued, as does State Line
here, "that there has been no redemption; that the statutory
method

of redemption

is exclusive, and no tender of the
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amount found to be due on the foreclosure with interest and
costs

having

been

made

and

the time having
. . . .ff

plaintiffs are without remedy

now

passed,

The court held,

however, on p. 624:
"It would be idle to require a mortgagor to pay or
tender the amount due when a purchaser at the sale
had used the property to his own profit and was in
equity or at law indebted to him in a sum far in
excess of the amount due on the mortgage debt."

"Defendant Brown insists that the removal of timber
is neither "rents" nor "profits" within the meaning
of the statute, and that, no tender having been
made, and the law providing for no accounting other
than for "rents and profits," the bar of a fixed
limitation intervenes to protect their title.
Aside from the narrow construction which must be
given to the statute to sustain this theory and
which we would be loath to adopt, it seems that the
law is ample to sustain the present action although
it be held that the removal of timber and its
conversion is neither "rents" nor "profits."
Similarly, in Stevens Mills Paper Co. v. Myers, 116 Me.
73,

100

At.

11

(1917),

the

purchaser

contended

that

redemption should not be allowed because no tender of the
redemption
period.

price was

actually

made within

the

redemption

But, because the purchaser had left the state two

days before the redemption period expired and remained there
until after such expiration and the redemption must be made
to the purchaser directly, the court held that the purchaser:
"designally prevented the plaintiff from tendering
performance of the condition of the mortgage by
rendering it impossible for him to do so, and a
court of equity will not now listen to his plea
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that the tender was not seasonably made. To do so
would be to permit him to take advantage of his own
wrong and to defeat the debtor's rights by fraud."
Furthermore, redemption has been allowed after expiration of
the redemption period on the grounds of accident in numerous
situations

where

payment

of

the

redemption

money

was

prevented by circumstances ranging from inability to reach
the place of foreclosure because of an accident to difficulty
in arranging the financing for the redemption money.

Many of

these situations are reviewed in Kopper v. Dver, 59 Vt. 477,
9 At. 4 (1887).
Further support for the position of the Lewises is found
in Granada. Inc. v. Tanner, 712 P.2d 254 (Utah 1985), one of
the few other Utah cases which interpret the redemption rule.
There, as in Loosley, supra, the assignee of the purchaser at
the sheriff's sale refused to accept a redemption so the
redeeming party paid

the redemption money

into court and

filed a petition to determine the redemption amount pursuant
to Rule 69(f)(3).

In holding that the redemption should be

allowed, this court stated, at 256:
"The intent of Rule 69(f)(3) is to allow a
redemptioner to pay the funds into court so that
the holder of the certificate of sale cannot clog
the equity of redemption by refusing to cooperate
in the redemption process."
In that case there was no dispute over the redemption amount
yet the court considered the use of a Rule 69(f)(3) petition
to determine the redemption

amount to be the appropriate

procedure to prevent the holder of the certificate of sale
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from

clogging

cooperate.

the

equity

of

redemption

by

refusing

to

If anything, the refusal to cooperate in the

redemption process in our case goes beyond that in Granada
and Lewises' use of a Rule 69(f)(3) petition and the deposit
in court to prevent the clogging of the equity of redemption
is also the appropriate procedure here.
There is sufficient precedent in the law and more than
sufficient discretion in equity to grant the relief requested
by Lewises.

They have demonstrated

their good

faith by

depositing $50,000.00 with the court, which is far more than
they estimated would be required to redeem after deducting
the costs of repairing the damage done by State Line.

Rule

69(f)(3) was designed to provide relief to redeeming parties
and should provide such relief here.

Rule 69(g)(1), on the

other hand, was designed to protect purchasers at sheriff's
sales

and

should

not be strained

to deny

relief to the

redeeming parties here.

CONCLUSION
The

facts

of

this

case

constitute

an

"appropriate

instance" for an extension of the redemption period and the
lower court properly exercised its equitable powers to extend
the time

for redemption

October 10, 1989.

for only

forty-three

days until

The efforts of State Line to dissolve that

extension and to force the Lewises to deposit the full amount
demanded

by

it

on

five-days'
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or

one-day's

notice

were

improper and were but a continuation of its efforts to "clog"
the equity of redemption which began when it sent a bulldozer
in to demolish the improvements on the property.

The lower

court1s

right

resulting

termination

of

the

Lewises1

of

redemption was in error.
Having filed a petition under Rule 69(f)(3) to determine
the reasonableness or propriety of the redemption amount, the
Lewises

were

entitled

to

prescribed by the rule.

a hearing

on that

petition

as

Not only the costs incurred by State

Line in the demolition of improvements, and claimed as an
addition to the redemption price, but also the damage caused
by State Line in such demolition, and claimed by Lewises as a
deduction from the redemption price, are appropriate matters
to consider at such a hearing.

Both arise out of the same

event and are part and parcel of the same foreclosure and
redemption

proceeding.

appropriate

procedure

Rule

to govern

69(f)(3)
this

outlines

situation.

the

It was

designed to protect redeeming parties against unreasonable
and improper demands by the purchaser.

On the other hand,

Rule 69(g)(1) was designed to protect the purchaser against
improper

actions

of

a

tenant

in

possession

application to the circumstances of this case.

and

has

no

The Lewises

should not be deprived of an opportunity to redeem their
property because of the wrongful destruction of that property
by State Line.

Equity supplies the relief and Rule 69(f)(3)

provides the procedure.
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The lower court's order of October 13, 1989 should be
reversed and this case should be remanded with instructions
to schedule a hearing pursuant to Rule 69(f)(3) to consider
both additions to and deductions from the redemption price,
including the costs of restoration of the property to the
condition it was in at the time of the sheriff's sale.

Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

Ralph J. Marsh
Attorneys for Appellants
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